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I. INTRODUCTION
"Death with dignity" is a slogan that matches the best Madison
Avenue has ever produced. Today the legal profession is buying
this "new and improved" product without any careful consideration of the justification for its existence. Euthanasia, or mercy kill*
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ing,' is a concept that has been debated by mankind for centuries.
With the abuses of the Nazi reign during World War HI, however,
all serious consideration of euthanasia was temporarily halted.
The modern post-war debate began in 1957 with Professor
Glanville Williams' comments on euthansia in his book, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law.2 Professor Kamisar responded3
one year later with an article critical of the pro-euthanasia cause.
Since the Kamisar article, a great deal of emotional rhetoric has
been traded over the issue, but no serious attempt has been made
to evaluate the anti-euthanasia arguments in light of the modern
4
trend described by the slogan "death with dignity."
This Article will examine both the arguments against euthanasia and the experience of a world that is rapidly beginning to accept euthanasia, in an effort to assess the wisdom of the current
pro-euthanasia trend. The argument will be made that the antieuthanasia cause, despite the impact of certain recent technological 5 and sociological 6 changes, is largely alive and well worth
resuscitating.
HI.

THE PRO-EUTHANASIA TREND

This Article will focus its examination of the pro-euthanasia
trend on three major manifestations of that trend-the Quinlan
case, 7 the Saikewicz case, 8 and so-called Living Will statutes 9 that
have been enacted by several states. Although the trend does not
exist in such a simple form, focusing on these three concrete and
widely discussed manifestations will reveal significant weaknesses
1. In an effort to meet the proponents of euthanasia, this Article will employ the
sales techniques they use so successfully. As if an analytical difference were
involved, I will gradually re-introduce the less antiseptic term "mercy-killing"
for the now popular term, "enthanasia." "Obligation to terminate" will replace "right to refuse invasive treatment," and the term "preservation of life"
will be used to embrace the "anti-euthanasia" view.
2. See Kamisar, infra note 3, at 969 n.2.
3. Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed Mercy-Killing Legislation, 42 Mium L. REv. 969 (1958). Professor Kamisar used this somewhat
unusual title because Williams had suggested that the only arguments
against euthanasia were based on the religious beliefs of certain groups. See
G. WILLIAMs, THE SANCT1TY OF LIFE AND THE C!iuNAL LAw 312 (1957).
4. See generally Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728, 730 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert.
deniedsub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). See infra notes 10
& 35 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.
7. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
8. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977).
9. See infra note 43.
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in the trend's position that cannot be negated by the inclusion of
additional details and variations.
A.

The Quinlan Case

In re QuinlanOwas the first significant formal" adjudication in
this country of the issue of whether euthanasia should be allowed
in the case of a terminally ill patient. With the eyes of the nation
upon them, the Supreme Court of New Jersey improperly ignored
prior New Jersey law and produced a decision plagued with major
logical faults and factual inaccuracies. The disasterous opinion in
Quinlan, however, was not simply the product of poor judicial
craftsmenship; the decision was inherently difficult due to the values enshrined in the concept of mercy-killing.
Before analyzing the holding in Quinlan, agreement on the
facts of the case must be reached. Ordinarily, the facts of a case
can be ascertained from the opinions of the courts that have considered them. However, the contrast between the trial court's
opinion12 and that of the New Jersey Supreme Court13 is so great
that it is difficult to believe that two courts were discussing the
10. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub noma. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976). Certiorari was not sought by any of the parties in the case, but a
right-to-life group sought to intervene and brought the case to the U.S.
Supreme Court, obviously lacking standing to do so.
11. There is a great deal of evidence that physicians have been informally making Quinlan-type decisions. See, e.g., In re Quinlan 70 N.J. 10, 46-47, 54, 355
A.2d 647, 667, 671 (1976).
12. See In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975).
Karen's condition was described as rather debatable:
Hospital records at the time of admission reflected [sic] Karen's
He [Dr. Morse] found her in a state of
vital signs to be normal ....
coma, with evidence of decortication indicating [an] altered level of
consciousness....
He found her oculo cephalic and oculo vestibular reflexes normal.
[Description of the tests omitted.]
He also found pupillary reaction to light in both eyes.
Dr. Jared testified [that] the blood tests were all normal while
Karen was on the respirator....
Dr. Morse indicated that the EEG performed at the outset established nothing abnormal for a comatose person, and did not establish
the offending agent to her central nervous system which caused her
unconsciousness. Subsequent EEG's provided no further information. All indicated brain rhythm or activity.
Id. at 237-240, 348 A.2d at 806-08.
Karen was characterized by her physicians as "viable," and suprisingly
active:
2. There was always a reaction to painful stimuli, she responded
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same case.14 Although the trial court heard the evidence and,
therefore, would be presumed to be the more reliable finder of
decerebrately to pain, she sometimes would grimace as if in pain,
which would be followed by increased rigidity of her arms and legs;
3. There would be periodic contractions and spasms, periodic
yawning...;
4. Pupils were sometimes dilated, sometimes normal, but almost
always sluggish to light;
9. Sometimes she would trigger spontaneous breathing without
the aid of and assist the respirator; othertimes she would go for periods without triggering it at all.
Id. at 241, 348 A.2d at 808-09. Most shockingly, the court found that "[o In May
7 nurses indicated she blinked her eyes two times when asked to and appeared
responsive by moving her eyes when talked to, but there is no further evidence of this type of reaction thereafter." Id. at 241, 348 A.2d at 809 (emphasis
added). Karen's condition was described by Dr. Morse as a "sleep-awake
type comatose condition." Id. More importantly, the court noted that Dr.
Morse was "unwillingto say she is in an irreversiblestate or condition." Id.
at 245, 348 A.2d at 811 (emphasis added). Notwithstanding this uncontradicted statement, the supreme court found her condition to be irreversible.
See infra note 13.
In addition, the trial court opinion included the following details: Karen
cried, during which time her mouth opened; her EEG showed normal activity
for a sedated person (she was sedated for the EEG); she breathed spontaneously at times; she did not have locked-in syndrome. Id. at 246, 348 A.2d 811.
It should be noted that the trial court stated, although inconsistent with the
evidence and its own findings, that "All agree she is in a persistent vegitative
state." Id. In view of the fact that Dr. Morse's statement to the contrary
appears earlier on the same page, this finding is difficult to explain. The trial
court repeated this conclusion, and then said "there is some medical qualification on the issue of her returning to discriminative functioning ...
" Id.
at 257, 348 A.2d at 817.
The trial court concluded that the right to terminate Karen's life would not
exist in a case where there was some doubt about her prognosis. The decision in this case to discontinue life support was left to her physicians, who
had testified that they did not feel her case warranted termination. Id. at 259,
348 A.2d at 818.
13. There was no opinion by the appellate court. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 18,
355 A.2d 647, 651 (1976). In contrast to the trial court, see supra note 12, the
supreme court "found" Karen's EEG to be "abnormal, but it showed some
activity." In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 23, 355 A.2d 647, 655-56 (1976). The court
also found that death would soon follow from her removal from the respirator. Id. at 25, 355 A.2d at 655-56. See also infra note 102 and accompanying
text.
More importantly, the court asserted that, "she can never be restored to
cognitive or sapient life." Id. at 26, 355 A.2d at 658 (emphasis in original).
14. It should also be noted that the trial court found, supported by the testimony
of all but one rather incredible witness, that the use of a respirator was "ordinary" rather than "extraordinary" treatment. In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super.
227, 247-48, 348 A.2d 801, 812 (1975). The supreme court, however, accepted the
church's characterization of these efforts as extraordinary. In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 31, 355 A.2d 647, 658 (1976).
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fact,15 it is also necessary to review the questionable independent
factual conclusions drawn by the supreme court since Quinlan
turns on the New Jersey Supreme Court's findings of fact.
From the outset, it must be assumed that Karen Ann Quinlan,
an otherwise healthy young woman, was in a comatose condition
with no hope of return to sapient human life.16 The question
before the court was whether Karen's parents, acting as her guardians, had the legal power to disconnect her respirator and trigger
her inevitable death.17 Only five years before Quinlan, a unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court, in John F. Kennedy Memorial
Hospital v. Heston, held that "there is no constitutional right to
choose to die."' 8 In Heston, a twenty-two-year-old unmarried woman who had been severely injured in an auto accident refused a
life-saving blood transfusion for religious reasons. 19 Heston
presented the difficult case of an adult with no dependants, who
simply wished to avoid intrusive medical intervention as a matter
of free choice. In an insightful opinion, 20 the court held that the
state's inherent interest in the preservation of human life was par15. See, e.g., F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 677 (2d ed. 1977), in which
it is stated that "[a]ppellate review is not a retrial of the case, but rather a
review concerning whether prejudicial error occurred in its original determination" and that "[rleview offactual determinationis very limited." Id. at
678 (emphasis in original). See also id. at 678-80.
16. See supra note 13.
17. See supra note 12 & infra note 102 and accompanying text.
18. 58 N.J. 576, 580, 279 A.2d 670, 672 (1971).
19. Id. at 578, 279 A.2d at 671. The New Jersey court had previously faced the
easier decision presented by the case of an infant whose parents' religious
beliefs forbade transfusions, State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962), and the case of a pregnant mother whose fetus
would also die if the mother's right to refuse transfusions were allowed. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d
537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964). See also John F. Kennedy Memorial
Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 577, 279 A.2d 670, 671 (1971).
It must be noted that the first amendment right of freedom of religion is,
on a comparative constitutional scale, far more important to the functioning
of our democratic society than "medical privacy." Under this analysis, the
patient in Heston should have been allowed to decline blood transfusions and
Karen Quinlan should not have been allowed to do so. Unfortunately, the
New Jersey Supreme Court reaches the opposite result.
20. Cf.Application of the Pres. and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1000, 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert.denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). In this case, Judge
J. Skelly Wright made a similar decision merely on the basis that it was necessary to preserve the status quo-thereby deciding the lawsuit. Id. at 1007.
Judge Miller, in his opinion dissenting from denial of an en bane rehearing
stated: "the orders entered on September 17 by one judge of this court did
not preserve the status quo ante by granting fully and finally all of the relief
sought, thus disposing of the matter on its merits." Id. at 1014.
It is clear that Judge Wright believed that the patient, in light of her lack of
serious opposition, wanted him to order the transfusion despite her token
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amount, and ordered the transfusion. 2 1
In light of Heston, the first embarrassingly weak link in the
Quinlan chain of analysis was exposed when the Quinlan court
concluded that an individual has a "privacy" right to choose freely
to terminate her own life.22 This proposition is without any accurate citation of authority,2 3 and, of course, the court omits any accurate reference to the Heston decision. The court does cite to the
concept of a federal right of privacy, but follows this discussion
with the statement, "nor is such right of privacy forgotten in the
objections, thereby relieving herself of the responsibility for the decision. Id.
at 1006-7. See also id. at 1009 ("Mrs. Jones wanted to live.").
21. The court found:
The solution sides with life, the conservation of which is, we think, a
matter of state interest. A prior application to a court is appropriate
if time permits it, although in the nature of the emergency the only
question that can be explored satisfactorily is whether death will
probably ensue if medical procedures are not followed. If a court
finds, as the trial court did, that death will likely follow unless a
transfusion is administered, the hospital and the physician should be
permitted to follow that medical procedure.
John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 583, 279 A.2d 670, 673
(1971). See also id. at 574, 279 A.2d at 674 (adopting the "compelling state
interest" test, and finding compelling state interest in the preservation of
life).
22. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 39-40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976).
23. The Quinlan court cited Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); and Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Eisenstadt dealt with access to contraceptives; Grimwold with contraceptives in a more general way. Roe, of course,
dealt with abortion, and Stanley with private possession of sexually explicit
material. The assertion in Roe that privacy rights give way to the state's interest in preserving life (in the third trimester, once the fetus is viable) would
seem to cut against, rather than for, the Quinlan analogy.
Heston is discussed in the Quinlan opinion solely for the odd and largely
unnecessary proposition that freedom of religion is not an absolute right.
While Heston, in a broad sense, does stand for this proposition, Karen Quinlan's religion did not prohibit the proposed mercy-killing; in fact, her church
filed an amicus brief in favor of it. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 35, 355 A.2d 647,
661 (1976). Thus, any freedom of religion objection to her termination was
largely irrelevant.
On the other hand, the parties saw Heston as the crucial case to either
follow, overrule, or distinguish. This is especially true from the perspective
of the hospital and doctors, who, statements in the supreme court's opinion
notwithstanding, opposed Karen Quinlan's termination. For example, the
trial court noted: "All defendants rely on John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital
v. Heston... to challenge the constitutional claims, asserting that no constitutional right to die exists and arguing a compelling state interest in favor of
preserving human life." In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 251, 348 A.2d 801,
814 (1975) (citation omitted). It simply strains credulity to suggest that the
New Jersey Supreme Court, which was obviously aware of Heston, did not
see its direct relevance to the case.
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New Jersey Constitution."2 4 Therefore, it is obvious that, in view
of Heston, the right to privacy in Quinlan is a major leap from existing authority. In a common law jurisdiction, however, the courts
often make new law and discard the old, albeit usually with a
somewhat greater degree of candor and some probing analysis of

the policy reasons for doing

So.

25

Even assuming, arguendo, that this right of privacy somehow
exists in the law of New Jersey or the federal constitution, the second weak link in the Quinlan analytical chain is exposed. If there
is a right to privacy, it is a right that the individual (Karen Quinlan) possesses as against the government and all others.26 While
the concept is well-established in the area of probate law that an
incompetent person's rights ought to be protected by allowing
someone else to exercise those rights on behalf of the incompetent
person, 27 it is not clear that such a concept ought to be extended by
facile analogy to the unique right of privacy as pronounced by the
Quinlan court. In essence this right exists because there are
choices that belong to the individual alone. Unless the individual
is capable of exercising those choices, they do not exist; just as a
father is not allowed to decide whether his twenty-two-year-old
daughter may have an abortion. To say the individual's right to
choose continues to exist because we give these private choices to
someone else is to engage in Orwellian newspeak.
Again assuming, arguendo, that the individual not only has this
24. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976).
25. First amendment rights, which succumbed to the state's interest in preserving life in Heston, see supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text, seem superior to the judicially created right of privacy. A candid appraisal of the issues
by the New Jersey court would require that Heston be overruled. Obviously,
this was not the court's intent. However, the court apparently had no rational
way of harmonizing or distinguishing the two decisions.
26. For example, Warren and Brandeis, who are generally credited with originating modern thought on privacy, defined it as the "right to be let alone." See
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L REV. 193, 193 (1890). The
phrase was actually coined by Judge Cooley. Id. at 195 n.4. "In every...
case the individual is entitled to decide whether that which is his shall be
given to the public." Id. at 199 (emphasis added). See also Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); infra note 30.
27. See, e.g., In re du Pont, 41 Del. Ch. 300, 194 A.2d 309 (1963). The trustee for an
incompetent acts as a substitute for the incompetent, and, subject to the control of the court, does whatever is necessary for the care and preservation of
the incompetent's estate: '"The court has, for the benefit of the [incompetent]
ward... all the powers over his estate which he could exercise, if present
and not under a disability, except the power to make a will." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 3B: 12-49 (West 1983). The remainder of the section, however, demonstrates
by the examples it employs that this power is designed to deal with financial
matters and the like. See also Hyland & Baime, In Re Quinlan: A Synthesis of
Law and Medical Technology, 18 JurmsTucs J. 107 (1977).
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newly found, well-established28 right to privacy, but that this right
of privacy can be protected by the questionable means of giving
the right to another who decides for the individual, the third weak
link in the Quinlan chain still must be faced. Having given the
individual the right to privacy, the Quinlan court concludes that
the decisions as to the exercise of this right of privacy should be
made by the patient, the patient's family, the patient's physician,
and the now-famous hospital "ethics" committee. 29 Considering
the number of persons and entities with an apparent veto power,
the result is that a privacy decision is made by popular election.3 0
The procedure is obviously ill-conceived; indeed, in Karen Quinlan's case, once the hopital ethics committee was formed, it, in ef28. Certainly the tone of the Quinlan opinion suggests that the privacy right was
not even debatable, but rather had clearly existed all along. A lie stated confi-

dently, perhaps will be believed.
29. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 49-51, 355 A.2d 647, 668-69 (1976). The idea originated
as a proposal by a physician for a committee which hospitals would be encouraged to form. See Teel, The Physicians' Dilemma: A Doctor's View:
What the Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 6 (1975).

The Quinlan court, not perceiving the conflict between such a notion and
privacy, found the "diffusion of ... responsibility for decision" to be a desirable aspect of such a process. In re Qulnlan, 70 N.J. 10, 50, 355 A-2d 647, 669
(1976). If the analogy to Griswold is appropriate (and the Quinlan court
thought that it was), the result is similar to deciding whether an individual
should use contraceptives by putting the issue to a popular vote. This, of
course, is what Griswold held that the state of Connecticut could not do.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Further, the Quinlan opinion failed to mention the composition of such
ethics committees, since the court seemed to assume that hospitals already
had them. The Attorney General of the State of New Jersey and the Assistant Attorney General, who appeared for the state in Quinlan, have discussed their experience with the case. See Hyland & Baime, In Re Quinlan:
A Synthesis of Law and Medical Technology, 18 JUIMETmICS J. 107 (1977).
They noted that not a single hospital in the state had an ethics committee at
the time. The Attorney General's office was soon beseiged with requests to
define the appropriate membership of such a committee. The Attorney General's reply, in the general thoughtless spirit of the Quinlan opinion, included
members of the clergy as participants on the committee. Members of the
clergy now appear on ethics committees as mandated by New Jersey law.
Further, Hyland and Baime admit that the court did not define the range
of the "family" to be included, noting that, "[a]lthough this appears to be a
simple matter, difficult questions might well arise when members of a family
disagree. ..

."

Id. at 126. See also infra note 94 and accompanying text.

30. Even Hyland and Baime, see supra note 27, at 124 & 127, expressed a concern
that such an arrangement itself might be an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), may be read as
both rejecting any substituted right of privacy and rejecting such a system of
veto rights, holding that the putative father of a fetus possesses no privacy
right to veto the mother's abortion request, either on his own behalf (as the
family had in the Quinlan decision mechanism), or on behalf of the fetus (as
Karen's father had, according to Quinlan).
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fect, nullified the supreme court's holding by deciding not to allow
Karen's termination.3 1 In a forum shopping effort unmatched
since the days of Harris v. Balk,32 the Quinlans moved Karen to
another hospital with a more agreeable ethics committee. 33 Even
so, Karen did not accomodate anybody, since some seven years after being taken off the respirator, she has not yet died.34
B.

The Saikewicz Case

The Saikewicz 35 opinion was a significantly better example of
legal reasoning. Whatever its faults and contradictions, the
Saikewicz court faced a more difficult problem than the Quinlan
court had and made a more sincere effort to address it. The most
significant problem with the Saikewicz opinion is its implicit and
explicit reliance on the unsound Quinlan decision.36
Saikewicz was a sixty-seven-year-old man who had developed
leukemia. 37 He was in the custody of a state home for the mentally
retarded because he was incapable of understanding his own predicament. In addition to trying to avoid the so-called "quality of
life" issue 38 (because that issue still bore the tarnish of the World
31. When the ethics committee at the original hospital reached the conclusion
that Karen's life ought not be terminated, she was transferred to Morrisview
Nursing Home, which then formed an ethics committee. The Morrisview
ethics committee agreed to the termination after a final effort to wean Karen
from the respirator failed. This information was obtained from telephone interviews with counsel for various parties to the Quinlan case.
32. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
33. See supra note 31. The suggestion has since been made that Karen's family
might now try cutting off the intravenous feeding, if such feeding can be characterized as a "life-sustaining apparatus" within the meaning of the Quinlan
opinion. See Hyland & Baime, supra note 29, at 126 n.140. It should now be
apparent that the "heroic measures" or "extraordinary care" or "life-sustaining apparatus" distinctions are meaningless. See infra notes 56-61 and
accompanying text.
34. Karen Quinlan was removed from the respirator on June 10, 1976. P. RAMSEY,
ETmics OF THE EDGES OF LiFE 298 (1978).
35. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977).
36. Id. at 738-40, 370 N.E.2d at 423-24, 428-29. It should be noted, however, that the
Saikewicz opinion cites John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J.
576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971), as standing for the proposition that a right of bodily
privacy does not exist. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 740-41, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977).
37. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 731,
370 N.E.2d 417, 420 (1977).
38. The court stated.
Evidence that most people choose to accept the rigors of chemotherapy has no direct bearing on the likely choice that Joseph Saikewicz
would have made. Unlike most people, Saikewicz has no capacity to
understand his present situation or his prognosis. The guardian ad
litem gave expression to this important distinction in coming to grips
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War II experience), the Saikewicz court had to deal with a situation that was uniquely difficult because of Saikewicz's retarded
condition. Saikewicz was so severely retarded that he would not
have understood the consequences of the horribly uncomfortable
process of chemotherapy. He would have had to have been
strapped to his bed constantly in order to keep him from unknowingly ripping the I.V.'s from his body.39 The Massachusetts
Supreme Court conceded that a normal person would have undergone the chemotherapy in an effort to possibly prolong life.40
Nonetheless, Saikewicz was allowed to die without the treatment
in order to spare him the uniquely magnified ordeal his retarded
41
condition would have caused.
A major point of difference between Saikewicz and Quinlan
concerns the question as to who should make the mercy-killing decision. The Saikewicz court rejected physicians and ethics committees, holding that this decision was to be made by the courts. 42
C.

Living Will Statutes

The so-called Living Will statutes (another example of Madison
Avenue language instituted by the pro-euthanasia cause) first appeared in 1976 with the enactment of the California Natural Death
Act. 43 In view of the creation, in Quinlan and Saikewicz, of a con-

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

with this "most troubling aspect" of withholding treatment from
Saikewicz: "If he is treated with toxic drugs he will be involuntarily
immersed in a state of painful suffering, the reason for which he will
never understand. Patients who request treatment know the risks
involved and can appreciate the painful side effects when they arrive.
They know the reason for the pain and their hope makes it
tolerable."
Id. at 730, 370 N.E.2d at 430. However, the court did not entirely avoid the
quality of life issue:
[Tihe chance of longer life carries the same weight for Saikewicz as
for any person, the value of life under the law having no relation to
intelligence or social position ....
To the extent that this forumation equates the value of life with any measure of the quality of life,
we firmly reject it. A reading of the entire record clearly reveals,
however, the [trial] judge's concern that special care be taken to respect the dignity and worth of Saikewicz's [sic] life precisely because of his vulnerable position.
Id. at 753-54, 370 N.E.2d at 431-32.
The court went on to characterize the trial court's use of the phrase, "quality of life" as "perhaps, an ill-chosen term." Id. Sigmund Freud would not
agree.
Id. at 750, 370 N.E.2d at 430.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 755-59, 370 N.E.2d at 432-35.
CAL.HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-95 (West Supp. 1976). The emotionally
tempting, but logically unrelated phrase "living will," which describes such
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stitutionally mandated obligation to terminate (a more accurate
description than "right to die") it would appear that these statutes
have become superfluous.44 However, these statutes, which allow
a citizen to decide, prior to becoming incapable of making the decision, whether to terminate life-sustaining procedures have become
fairly popular and have been enacted by fourteen states and the
45
District of Columbia.
The California act, which is fairly typical, envisions that the directive to a physician should take the following form:
Directive to Physicians
Directive made this
day of
(month, year).
I,
.
being of sound mind, willfully, and voluntarily make
known my desire that my life shall not be artificially prolonged under the
circumstances set forth below, do hereby declare:
1. If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease, or illness
certified to be a terminal condition by two physicians, and where the application of life-sustaining procedures would serve only to artificially prolong the moment of my death and where my physician determines that my
death is imminent whether or not life-sustaining procedures are utilized, I
direct that such procedures be withheld or withdrawn, and that I be permitted to die naturally.
2. In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use of
such life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention that this directive shall
be honored by my family and physician(s) as the final expression of my
legal right to refuse medical or surgical treatment and accept the consequences from [sic] such refusal.
4. I have been diagnosed and notified at least 14 days ago as having a
terminal condition by
l M.D., whose address is
, and whose telephone number is

_

I un-

derstand that if I have not filled in the physician's name and address, it
death requests, appears to have originated in Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia The Living Will, A Proposal,44 IND.L.J. 539 (1969). Kutner envisioned
a far more "active" process; he introduced the article with a compassionate
version of a story about a man who shot his mother. However, by the end of
the article, the term "living will" was being used to advance the idea of passive euthanasia simply because it was less in conflict with existing case law.
Id. at 550-51.
44. Since the right asserted in Quinlan, and Saikewicz is said to be of constitutional magnitude, it would seem that the hospital is now legally obligated to
terminate a patient in Karen Quinlan's condition because of her "privacy
right," regardless of the patient's view on the subject. See In re Quinlan, 70
NJ. 10, 40-42, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976). The Quinlan court disregarded recounts of expressions made by Karen, prior to the incident that rendered her
unconscious, that she would like to be allowed to die, saying "such testimony
is without sufficient probative weight." Id. See also id. at 22, 355 A.2d at 653.
45. Living Will statutes have been enacted in Alaska, Arkansas, California, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Idaho, Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oregon, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. Florida has
such a right by judicial construction. See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v.
Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611, 620 (Fla. App. 1983).
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shall be presumed that I did not have a terminal condition when I made
out this directive.
5. This directive shall have no force or effect five years from the date
filled in above.
6. I understand the full import of the directive and I am emotionally
and mentally competent to make this directive.
Signed
City, County, and State of Residence
The declarant has been personally known to me and I believe him or
her to be of sound mind.
Witness
46
Witness

The provisions of paragraphs one and four provide significantly
different kinds of consent. Paragraph one operates prior to the onset of a terminal illness, while paragraph four operates after the
illness has been diagnosed as terminal. Whereas the general declaration in paragraph one is merely a factor the physician may
weigh in his "medical" 47 judgment, a declaration pursuant to paragraph four is absolutely binding on the physician.
Under the California statute, the declarant must be an
"adult."48 This provision was specifically included to eliminate vicarious consent by parents for their children or by guardians of an
incompetent. 4 9 As a further safeguard, the directive must be reexecuted every five years to remain valid, and can be revoked at
50
any time, even by a simple oral statement.
These statutes provide a potentially viable answer to the obvious criticisms of the Quinlan opinion's second major weak linksubstituted privacy; that is granting the terminally ill patient's privacy decisions to a third party. However, even though there was a
brief flurry of activity following their initial enactment, the actual
use of Living Wills has declined. 1 This decline is most likely not
due to the fact that the citizenry is now opposed to euthanasia, but
rather that they failed to plan for the possible occasion of its necessity. One student commentator 52 picks up this point and argues
that the mere failure to execute a Living Wi53 should not be taken
46. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1983).
47. Id. § 7191(b) & (c).
48. Id. § 7194. In addition, a person may only execute such a document on his
own behalf.
49. See Kaplan, EuthanasiaLegislation: A Survey and a Model Act, 2 AMER. J.
LAw & MED. 41, 63 (1976).
50. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189 (West Supp. 1983).
51. Note, Statutory Recognitionof the Right to Die: The CaliforniaNaturalDeath
Act, 57 B.U.L. REv. 148, 148 (1977).
52. Id. at 173.
53. See infra note 56.
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as a contrary declaration.5 4 That is, even in the states that have
authorized Living Wills, the failure of a person to execute such a
directive does not eliminate the basic Quinlan/Saikewicz obligation to terminate. Although a harsh counter argument may be
made, i.e., because the patient had the opportunity to execute a
Living Will, it should be presumed that he intentially by-passed
that right (an analogy to the "legislative inaction" approach to statutory interpretation),55 such an approach would likely place the
law entirely out of step with reality.
TI.

THE ACTIVE/PASSIVE DISTINCTION

The distinction between "active" and "passive" euthanasia is
an emotional distinction, but one that is without substance. The
distinction
plays upon a sense that it is somehow better to
"merely"5 6 let someone die, than it is to actively kill them. It is
clear that this distinction is of some importance in criminal law,
because it is unrealistic to insist that every member of American
society will make overt sacrifices to save the lives of strangers.5 7
However, it is well established even in criminal law that where a
special relationship of dependancy exists between the parties, an
affirmative obligation to act will be imputed.58 For example, although a stranger has no obligation to render aid,5 9 a parent may
not allow its helpless child to drown in a three-foot pool of water
where the parent could step in without danger and save the child.60
Where a person is immobilized in a hospital bed, and the situa54. See Note, supra note 51, at 169-70.
55. See, e.g., Alter v. Michael, 64 Cal. 2d 480, 483, 413 P.2d 153, 155, 50 Cal. Rptr. 553,
555 (1966).

56. The word "mere" is an inherently anti-analytical word. Anything can be
made to sound less important, less horrifying, or less surprising by simply
placing the word "mere" before it. Compare, for example, "starvation"
(sounds pretty awful) with "mere starvation" (no one would volunteer for it,
but there must be something worse). A lawyer, judge or writer of any kind
who must resort to the use of the word "mere" to get a point across is
"merely" displaying his inability to explain, either because the speaker or
writer lacks the analytical skill or because no analytically significant point
can be made.
57. See generally J. HALT, GENERAL PRinCIPALS OF CRniNAL LAw 190-205, 208-11
(2d ed. 1960); W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRnvm AL LAw 182-191 (1972); Hughes,
CriminalOmissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590 (1958).
58. See W. LAFAvE &A. ScoTr, supra note 57, at 184 and authorities cited therein.
For example, a parent may be guilty of criminal homicide for failure to call a
doctor for his sick child. See id. at 184 n.4 (discussing cases in which parents
believing in prayer, rather than medicine, failed to call a physician).
59. Id. at 184.
60. Id. at 182 ('The trend of the law has been toward enlarging the scope of duty
[sic] to act."). See generally Hughes, supra note 57.
However, consider the view of another criminal law professor.
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tion involves, for example, the physician "merely" disconnecting
an I.V. or pulling the plug on resuscitory machinery, the physician's affirmative duty is even stronger than that of the parent to a

child.
The active/passive distinction is being employed by euthanasia
proponents because of its emotional appeal. If alleviating suffering
is the goal of the pro-euthanasia cause, the passive approach is, of
course, counterproductive since there will be many situations
where a simple affirmative act by the physician could enthanatize
the patient with much less pain. Therefore, although the tenor of
this Article opposes euthanasia, it may be appropriate, if society as
a whole decides to embrace the position so as to permit active euthanasia to reduce needless suffering. The use of passive euthanasia, however, perpetuates society's acceptance of mercy-killing.
Therefore, the passive approach will become obsolete. The temporary presence of passive euthanasia on the emotional horizon
ought not to be used, like the proverbial salesman's foot, to wedge
open the door leading to the acceptance of active euthanasia.
A similarly meaningless distinction is sometimes made between so-called "ordinary" measures and "heroic" measures. Today's heroic measures will be tomorrow's ordinary measures as
society becomes acclimated to the technological advances associated with those procedures. 61 Contrary to modem thought the use
An infant starved to death in Chicago. Its parents did not supply
it with food necessary to sustain life. No one in the block fed it. No
one in Chicago fed it. There were more than one hundred and seventy million people in the United States who did not feed it ....
But if the neighbors who knew about the situation were held legally
chargeable with the death, there might be no end of officious meddling in other homes.
R. PElu~s, CRnNAL LAw 516 (1957).
Other nations have adopted a stronger view than the American approach.
For example, French law requires one to aid his fellow man when he can do
so without danger to himself. See Languier, French Penal Law and the Duty
to Aid Persons in Danger, 38 TUL. L. REv. 81 (1963).
Hughes, supra note 57, at 632-34, describes similar provisions in Communist countries.
61. For example, since Karen Quinlan failed to die when disconnected from the
respirator, Hyland and Baime, supra note 27, at 126 n.140, suggest an example
of such a transition to a willingness to accept a greater degree of activity:
'"The change in [Karen's] condition has caused some to speculate whether
the Quinlan decision permits the family to [now] request termination of intravenous feeding." See also In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453 (App. Div.
1983). It should be noted that Hyland and Baime (and others) have begun to
refer to passive euthanasia by a new name (as if the nomenclature somehow
further distinguishes it from mercy-klling)-antidysthanasia. See Hyland &
Baime, supra note 27, at 126 n.140, and authorities cited therein. Aside from
being considerably more difficult to pronounce, any significant difference between the words antidysthanasia and mercy-killing is certainly not apparent.
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of intervenous feeding would have been deemed heroic in the recent past. Medicine marches on. For this reason it is unlikely that
this distinction can ever have a fixed meaning in the rapidly changing sequence of technological progress.
For analytical purposes, the concept of "brain death" must also
be eliminated from this discussion. With improvements in medical
technology, the original definition of death (cessation of breathing
and heartbeat) has become obsolete. In what is more a change of
form than of substance, many jurisdictions have enancted brain
death statutes, 62 while other jurisdictions have reached the same

result through adjudication. 63 Therefore, it must be assumed, in

view of technological advances, that the definition of death in
terms of a complete cessation of brain function (flat EEG)64 will
become the standard embraced in all jurisdictions as the question
arises.
The complete brain cessation approach is clearly a reasonable
redefinition of death. However, some commentators argue that the
flat EEG approach is too conservative: "We consider life to include
human qualities and, therefore, submit that a quadraplegic formerly extroverted college trampoline champion would consider
himself to be, in effect, dead." 65However, the type of sophistry implicit in such a metaphysical expansion of the term "death," must
62. See ALASKA STAT § 09.65.120 (Supp. 1975); CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180
(West Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1975); MD. ANN. CODE art.
43 § 54F (Supp. 1975); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 1-2-2.2 (Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. tit.

63 § 1-3201(g) (Supp. 1976); VA. CODE § 32.364-3:1 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE
§ 16-19-1(b) (Supp. 1976). See generally Capron & Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standardsfor Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a
Proposal,121 U. PA. L REV. 87 (1972); Mills, Statutory Brain Death?, 229 J.
A.MA 1225 (1974).
63. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249,366 N.E.2d 744 (1977); New
York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d 1002, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686
(1975). Cf. Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 579, 317 S.W.2d 275 (1958). See generally
Capron & Kass, supra note 62; Dworkin, Death in Context, 48 IND. UJ. 623
(1973); Friloux, Death, When Does It Occur?, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 13 (1975); Gorney, The New Biology and the Future of Man, 15 U.C.LA. L REV. 273 (1968);
Hirsh, BrainDeath, 12 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 388-89 (1975); Mills, supra note 62.
64. Brain death was originally proposed by two French researchers. See Mollaret & Goulon, Le Coma Depasse, 101 REV. NEUROLOGY 3 (1959). However,
the Harvard group appears to have popularized the idea in the American
medical community. Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to
Examine the Definition of Brain Death, A Definition ofIrreversibleComa 205
J. A.M.A. 337 (1968).
65. Spudis & Oleck, Management of Seven Stable Levels of Brain Death, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 5, 5 (1977). It should also be noted that much of the discussion of
Quinlan has focused on the possiblity that Karen was defined as "already
dead," although she clearly had too much brain activity to be considered dead
by any accepted standard. See Hyland & Baime, supra note 27.
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be avoided because it would simply constitute euthanasia by a different name.
IV. THE CASE FOR THE PRESERVATION OF LIFE
The case for the preservation of life can be broken down into
twelve basic component arguments. The arguments in their totality, including their synergistic interaction, present a realistic picture of the dangers and drawbacks of the superficially attractive
process of euthanasia.
A.

Deterrence Without Punishment

Prior to the Quinlan decision, it was clear that euthanasia was
condemned as murder by the American legal system. 66 It is clear,
however, that acts of euthanasia occurred. As with any crime, the
deterrent value of the law is not infinite. In 1959, Professor
Kamisar surveyed the euthanasia cases actually brought to trial
67
and found that juries rarely, if ever, convicted the indicted party.
Thus, euthanasia's status as murder under the criminal law operated in what might be considered an ideal fashion: those who contemplated committing euthanasia were strongly deterred by the
danger of punishment for such a serious crime as murder; and yet,
when circumstances were so grave and desperate as to negate the
deterrent effect, no punishment followed. The fear of prosecution,
in effect, was an excellent selection device. This fear insured that
in order for loved ones to be willing to commit euthanasia, they
would have to be so certain of its necessity that they would, in
desperation, risk prosecution for murder.
More importantly, keeping euthanasia illegal "on the books"
served the important purpose of reinforcing social values. However, the social attitude against euthanasia bolstered the deterrent
66. See Kamisar, supra note 3, at 970 ('The law on the books condemns all mercy

killings.").
67. Id. at 971-73. Kamisar's thesis that a law may work ideally when it strikes the
correct balance between deterrence and disobedience was excellently set
forth in a more general context:
Most laws are introduced with the expectation that they will
sometimes be broken, but it is generally thought that noncompliance
dimishes the utility of laws. It is possible, however, to design laws
the utility of which is actually enhanced by a certain amount of noncompliance.
... Thus, laws should be constructed not as if they are to function
in a society in which universal compliance will occur, but should be
formulated to achieve the best results under the level of compliance
that is expected to preval.
Note, Laws That Are Made to be Broken" Adjustingfor Anticipated Noncompliance, 75 MICH. L. REv. 687, 688 (1977).
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accomplishments of the law: those who would euthanatize their
loved ones would have to be not only so desperate as to risk prosecution, but also so desperate as to overcome the moral struggle
within themselves that grew out of the well-institutionalized social
values favoring the sanctity of life.
The concession inherent in this argument is that some extreme
situations warrant a decision in favor of euthanasia. Thus, the circular reinforcing effect of murder statutes and societal norms
could break down. However, the murder statutes' inherent selection process operates in a placebo-like sense to restrict euthanasia
to the most sincerely desperate cases. A patient who is told of the
nature of his placebo will not likely respond to its intended psychological effect. Thus, because the public was generally unaware of
the lack of punishment, the statutes acted to screen out all but the
most extreme cases of euthanasia.
B.

The Rational Choice

Proposals for euthanasia 68 begin with an acceptance of the
premise of "voluntary" euthanasia. Voluntary euthanasia, simply
defined, occurs when the patient, who is terminally ill and in great
pain, makes his own decision to be euthanatized. Certainly, after
the not-so-voluntary acts of euthanasia that took place under the
Nazi government during World War II, voluntary euthanasia is, on
the surface, the only socially acceptable proposal. However, the
concept of such a choice being made by the patient who is a candidate for euthanasia has been questioned. In a now somewhat classic phrase, Dr. Frohman suggests that, by definition, such a person
must be crazed with pain, yet sane enough to make the most important decision of his life.69 Obviously, if the patient is not in severe pain, there is no desperate need to euthanatize him.7 0 Thus,
68. See, e.g., A. DOWNING, EurHANASiA AND THE RIGHT TO DEATH (1969); J.
FLETCHER, MORALS AND MEDICINE (1954); J. SULLrvAN, THE MORALITY OF

MERCY-KLLING (1950); Banks, Euthanasia,161 PRAC. 101 (1948); Cantor, A
Patient'sDecisionto Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity
Versus the Integrity ofLife, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228 (1973); Gurney, Is There A
Right to Die?-A Study of The Law of Euthanasia,3 Cum.-SAM. L REV. 235
(1972); Sharpe & Hargest, Lifesaving Treatment for Unwilling Patients, 36
FORDHAm L. REV. 695 (1968); Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of
Homocide:1,37 COLUm. L REV. 701 (1937); Note, Voluntary Active Euthanasia
for the Terminally Ill and the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy,69 CORNELL L
REv. 363 (1984). Certainly an exhaustive listing is not intended here. However, from the sheer volume of such publications, it may be inferred that euthanasia requires a great deal of "selling" to make it acceptable.
69. Forhman, Vexing Problems in Forensic Medicine: A Physician's View, 31
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1215, 1222 (1956).
70. The only argument for euthanatizing a comatose patient, for example, is to
save the money being paid for medical bills. There are, of course, some who
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there is an inherent contradiction in the concept of voluntary euthanasia. Opponents of euthanasia are not simply nitpicking with
its proponents on the technical issue of when consent is legally
acceptable. Instead, the opponents contend that the concept of individual consent to voluntary euthanasia is entirely insincere and
that it is used merely as a vehicle to slowly sell involuntary
euthanasia.
Another problem regarding the idea of rational choice in a voluntary euthanasia situation is inherent in the finality of the decision. Certainly, people change their minds, and those who are ill
and restricted to bed are prey to significant ups and downs in their
emotions:
Assuming for the purpose of argument, that the occasion when a euthanasia candidate possesses a sufficiently clear mind can be ascertained and
that a request for euthanasia is then made, there remain other problems.
The mind of the pain-racked may occasionally be clear, but is it not also
likely to be uncertain and variable? Lord Horder, in the House of Lords
debates:
During the morning depression he [the patient] will be
found to favor the application under this Bill, later in the day
he will think quite differently, or will have forgotten all about
it. The mental clarity with which noble Lords who present
this bill are able to think and to speak must not be thought to
have any counterpart in
the alternating and confused judg71
ments of the sick man.

Unfortunately, the decision to be euthanatized is not one that can
be reversed. Thus, a patient who does not wish to be euthanatized
on seven occasions but decides to choose euthanasia on the eighth,
will never have a ninth. It is not idle speculation to consider the
possibility that had that ninth occasion occurred, the patient might
have changed his mind.
At first glance, it appears that many of these objections are anbelieve in euthanatizing patients to save money. See infra notes 106 & 112
and accompanying text.
Surprisingly, one of the post Quinlan-Saikewicz cases, while relying on
the comatose patient's right to privacy, candidly admits that the patient has
no interest in the outcome! See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611, 615 (Fla. App. 1983) ("Every court that has considered a
similar situation has concluded that a terminally ill comatose patient, like his
fully conscious and competent counterpart, has a right to refuse medical
treatment.") Not seeing any inconsistency, that court conceded:
"[Wie may assume that in the case of a comatose individual there is
no pain and suffering (philosophical considerations aside), then it
would seem to follow that the direct beneficiary of the request is the
family of the patient and that the benefits are financial savings and
cessation of the emotional drain occasioned by awaiting the medicolegal death of a loved one.
Id. at 618 (emphasis added).
71. Kamisar, supra note 3, at 988.
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swered by the Living Will concept. Under this statutory scheme,
the patient makes the decision at a time when he is still well
enough to make such a rational choice. Yet, how many decisions
made in advance are rejected when the time comes to go through
with them? Professor Kamisar makes this point clear by analogy
to a classic Aesop's fable:
It was a bitter-cold day in the wintertime, and an old man was gathering broken branches in the forest to make a fire at home. The branches
were covered with ice, and many of them were frozen and had to be pulled
apart, and his discomfort was intense. Finally the poor old fellow became
so thoroughly wrought up by his suffering that he called loudly upon
death to come. To his surprise, Death came at once, and asked what he
wanted. Very hastily the old man replied, "Oh nothing; except to help me
carry this bundle of sticks home so that I may make a fire." 72

C.

Medical Error

There is a tendency among doctors to look upon themselves as
gods, and, even worse, a tendency of the lay populace (including
lawyers) to be foolish enough to accept the image. It is, however,
sobering to reflect upon the degree to which the lay public believes
that the legal profession also possesses an almost mystical degree
of knowledge. Yet, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court recently asserted that one third of the attorneys practicing today are
incompetent. 73 Lawyers who make a point of keeping up to date in
even a few fields wonder why the distinguished Chief Justice
picked so low a percentage. 74 Somehow, however, lawyers fail to
72. Kamisar, supra note 3, at 989 n.56 (quoting Walsh, Life is Sacred, 94 FORUM
333, 333-34 (1955)).

The inherent value of life and the frightening status of death have varied
over the course of history. Obviously, when the early Romans were enjoying
watching gladiators being killed and Christians being fed to the lions, an extreme view of the value of human life was in vogue. Although it may be a
biased opinion, the fact that human life is considered so vital that it cannot be
meaningfully reflected upon in the hypothetical context seems a tribute to
our degree of civilization.
73. Address by Chief Justice Burger, The Fourth John F. Sonnet Memorial Lecture at Fordham University Law School (Nov. 26, 1973). See also Address by
Chief Justice Burger, American Bar Association Mid-Year Conference, Chicago, Ill. (1978). The figures quoted by the Chief Justice varied from onethird to one-half, and he noted that some of the judges he had spoken to felt
that 75 percent of the practicing attorneys they worked with were
incompetent.
74. One may also wonder why the Chief Justice did not include a higher percentage for the judiciary. The author, a civil procedure professor, is constantly
bombarded with requests for advice on procedural matters from the bench
and Bar. Candor compels the comment that a first year student who did not
know the answers to many of these questions would fail civil procedure.
Consider, for example, a state court trial judge with over ten years' judicial
experience who did not understand that there are constitutional limits on a
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wonder about the related percentage of incompetence among their
fellow professionals-the physicians. 7 5 It is the physician who informs the patient that he is terminally ill, and whose decisions are
accepted with enough certainty and confidence to permit the patient to choose euthanasia.
Medicine never was and, at least for some time, will not be an
exact science. There is obviously room for error, but the ramifications of that room for error are exacerbated in the context of the
terminally ill patient. Here the physician, who perceives himself
to be a god-like character, finds himself frustratingly helpless to
work the all-important, god-like miracle his patient so badly needs.
There are deep-rooted psychological dynamics involved in such a
situation, which certainly vary from physician to physician; but
these dynamics are only likely to further impair the already limited ability of the physician to save lives.
The ultimate decision as to whether euthanasia, in the rare, appropriate cases, has so much value that it is worth the risk of mistakes by physicians, is a matter of personal judgment. However,
this problem must be taken into account, along with the other criticisms that have been and will be suggested when facing the ultimate question of whether euthanasia's advantages exceed its
numerous drawbacks. It may be noted that these drawbacks are
somewhat synergistically interrelated. Thus, as society begins to
accept euthanasia (a dangerous situation for reasons discussed below), the decision to terminate life becomes an easier and more
routine choice for the fallible physician to make, and increased
medical errors will result.
D. The Contradictions Inherent in Safeguards
In response to the criticisms previously discussed, proponents
of euthanasia may point out that safeguards designed to substantially reduce the dangers of mercy-killing are feasible. For example, a patient who wishes to be terminated would first have to be
declared terminally ill by his physician and a process of additional
physician verification would have to be employed. 76 In addition, a
state's exercise of long-arm jurisdiction-having never even heard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Unfortunately, this is not
an extreme example.
75. Analogies between the percentage of incompetent lawyers and the percentage of incompetent doctors yield frightening results. Keep in mind that phy-

sicians, practicing at the time of this writing, who are in their late fifties,
received their medical education in the 1940's. Hopefully physicians make a
greater effort to stay abreast of developments than their lawyer counterparts.
For details on medical error, see generally D. CRANE, THE SANCTITY OF SOcIAL LIFE: PHYSICIANS' TREATMENT OF CRrrIcALLY ILL PATIENTS (1975).
76. See Kamisar, supra note 3, at 978-79.
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proposal to alleviate the danger of a patient later changing his
mind would be to have a patient, who wishes to be killed, affirm
77
that desire repeatedly over a set period of time before qualifying.
However, such "safeguards" necessarily prolong the process of
euthanatizing the terminally ill patient and make the process addiso as to virtually negate any value euthanasia
tionally painful,
78
provides.
When Kamisar made the argument that euthanasia is inherently problematic, he anticipated that the proponents of euthanasia would attack him as disengenuous. He thus characterized
himself, from their view, as an "obstructionist." 79 Although
Kamisar contends that the process is prone to error because it
lacks sufficient safeguards, and he objects when safeguards are
proposed, he then raises the argument to a third analytical level.
He places the blame for an unworkable system of euthanasia on
the fact that the concept of euthanasia, itself, has built-in contractions. The process is inherently one that must be accurate to a
level commensurate with the drastic nature of its action, and yet
must be swift and painless. A swift, painless, and nearly perfect
procedure for making such difficult and amorphous judgments is
simply beyond the power of mere mortals. If mercy-killing is to be
accepted, it must be accepted with the knowledge that there will
be either risks of error or a drawn out process.
A partial answer to Kamisar's argument might be found in
some balanced middle ground between the two extremes. Such
compromises, however, like many other legislative compromises, it
is feared, would produce the benefits of neither extreme and the
drawbacks of both. Such a result is especially true in view of the
anticipated impact of societal acclimation to the concept and use of
euthanasia. What today may be viewed as a drastic decision warranting the greatest of care at each of a few slightly safeguarded
steps, will all too soon become routine-a mere matter of obtaining
the signatures of those installed to effectuate the bureaucratic procedure. Controlling substance through procedure is a difficult if
not impossible task, as students of, for example, administrative
77. Id. at 978.
78. Id. at 978-79. Professor Kamisar notes:
I venture to say there are few men indeed who will not so much as
smile at the portion of the American Society's Bill [citations omitted], which provides that if the petition for euthanasia shall be denied by a [trial judge], "an appeal may be taken to the appellate
division of the supreme court, and/or to the Court of Appeals."
Id. at 978 n.33.
79. Id. at 981. The word "obstructionist" was italicized in Williams' book. See G.
Wn UjAms, supra note 3, at 334.
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law certainly know. 80
E.

The "Sails of Rescue"

In the famous lifeboat-cannibalism cases studied in basic criminal law, one of the arguments made against cannibalism is phrased
in terms of the potential for the "sails of rescue" to appear unexpectedly on the horizon at any time. The "sails of rescue" analogy
also applies to the terminally ill patient, because today's terminal
illness may be curable tomorrow, next week, or next year. For example, enormous strides are being made toward the cure of previously fatal cancers; and, while less dramatic than the
instantaneous cure for polio achieved in the 1950's, these advances
are no less substantial in their impact. 81 The chances for medical
progress, if a patient's life is prolonged for even six months, are
substantial. Who would be comfortable with making the decision
to terminate a loved one's life only to find that a cure was subsequently discovered?
Although Kamisar characterized the "sails of rescue" as "utilitarian," 82 it is really a "greatest good for the greatest number" approach. The "sails of rescue" argument, standing alone, will not
end the euthanasia controversy, but it signifies a substantial tragic
danger to be weighed against the perceived value of mercy-killing.
F. Hidden Conflicts in the Decisionmaking Process
In the effort to market euthanasia to the public, the discussion
of voluntary euthanasia has been focused on the assumption that a
terminally ill patient is free from some very important conflicts of
interest in his decision to be terminated. It is erroneously assumed, for example, that it is only the patient's pain that will motivate his decision to commit euthanasia. Kamisar argues that it is
often the suffering of the patient's loved ones and the frustration of
80. Judge Bazelon's well-known view in Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 817 (1977), notwithstanding the demise of
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973), at the
hands of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), demonstrates the problem. Judge
Bazelon argues that the key to good substantive decisions lies in devising
appropriate procedures to fit each unique question.
81. See, e.g., S. CARTER, E. GLATSTEIN & R. LIVINGSTON, PRINCIPLES OF CANCER

TREATMENT 13 (1982). See also the following pamphlets prepared by the office
of Cancer Communications, National Cancer Institute: Progress Against
Cancer of the Larnyx (Oct. 1980); Progress Against Cancer of the Testes (Oct.
1980); Progress Against Cancer of the Uterus (Oct. 1978); Progress Against
Hodgkins Disease (1978); Progress Against Leukemias, Lymphomas, and
Multiple Myeloma (June 1982).
82. Kamisar, supra note 3, at 974.
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his physicians that motivate the patient to choose euthanasia.
Even worse, Kamisar suggests, people might begin to take the substantial cost of prolonged medical care into account, and choose to
be killed for lack of money.83 The potential is great for a terminally
ill patient to feel overpowering guilt about the great strain he
places on the financial resources of the family because of what
may come to be perceived as an unnecessary prolongation of life.
Today, both the cost of medical treatment and the suffering of third
parties might be considered important values to be weighed when
choosing euthanasia. However, euthanasia should then be proposed with those factors as candid considerations. No advocate of
euthanasia to date has been willing to draw the battle lines in such
hostile territory.
G.

Societal Damage

When Kamisar wrote about euthanasia in 1958, the nation was
still basically unified in its condemnation of mercy-killing. However, moving society from a clear dedication to preservation of life
to accepting killing under certain circumstances risks blurring the
lines of certain important social values. When the first step on a
new path is taken, it must be asked what the second and third
steps will be. Today's "impossible" has a tendency to become tomorrow's "probable," the next day's "ordinary," and finally, the
"expected." As Justice Cardozo once stated, "[t]he half truths of
one generation tend at times to perpetuate themselves in the law
84
as the whole truths of another."
Put simply, there is a fear that mercy-killing will only initially
be accepted in very narrowly drawn and carefully chosen contexts
because of the high societal regard for the value of life. Although
these initial decisions will be made with great care and determination, the extreme and abhorent choice will be considered only in
the most disastrous circumstances, the choices involved in mercy83. Id. at 991. For a surprisingly candid admission of monetary motives, see John
F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. App. 1983). See
also supra note 70.
Basic family dynamics are also frightening. Virtually all of the reported
cases to date seem to involve decisions made by "loving" family members.
See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 38, 355 A.2d 647, 662 (1976). What will happen when not-so-loving family members make the same mistake? One court
has noted: "One need not go so far back in history as Cain and Abel to recognize that interests of various family members are not always synonymous
nor even harmonious. The newspaper is a daily reminder that murderers are
often related to their victims." John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611, 618 (Fla. App. 1983).
84. See, e.g., Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N.Y.
369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927).
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killing decisions will not lend themselves to the drawing of clear
lines. As society becomes accustomed to the killing, and as the
value of the preservation of life declines, the safeguard of
abhorence toward the process will break down. Mercy-killing will
become a normal, accepted choice of medical treatment. Careful
decisions will become routine decisions.
Because the most likely candidate for mercy killing is a terminally ill person who is suffering great, needless pain, it soon becomes evident that inexorable decisions involving the quality of
life must be made. Thus, the question is raised: When is the quality of life so impaired as to mandate killing? In a free society, it
ought not be suggested that there are questions that should not be
asked. The argument presented here is not that mankind cannot
survive the questions surrounding euthanasia. Rather, mankind
cannot naively assume that today's answer will remain fixed in the
future. There are times when the law must apply a "bright line"
approach and, unfortunately, risk inflexibility for the sake of clarity of purpose. 85
An interesting insight into the criticism of the "bright line" approach is supplied by Professor Friedman. She has written on
amniocentesis, the process of testing for genetic defects in a fetus
while abortion is still possible:
At least one legal expert believes that any mandatory screening or prenatal diagnosis program will inevitably result in compulsory abortion legislation. He reasons that "those [found to be carriers] who reject the ever
more popular solution of abortion [will] appear more and more to be recalcitrants.... ." But retardation cannot be "wiped out," because it is defined in relative terms. If all those presently defined as retarded are
wished out of sight tomorrow, then society would simply turn its attention
to a new group to whom it would give the same label .... 86

H. The Danger that Voluntary Euthanasia Proposals Will be Used to
Gain Acceptance for Involuntary Euthanasia
There is a significant danger that, as voluntary mercy-killing is
accepted and the value of the uniform preservation of life is rejected, society will begin to look with euthanatizing eyes towards
those unfortunate individuals whose suffering is so great that they
have no ability to make a voluntary choice to be terminated. Thus,
85. Examples of the "bright-line" approach come from varying areas of law. For
example, in order to avoid jurisdictional squabbles, the new Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over all cases with any patent claims.
See generally Cihlar & Goldstein, A Dialogue About Potential Issues in the
PatentJurisdictionof the Court of Appealsfor the FederalCircuit 10 A.P.L.A.
Q.J. 284 (1982).
86. Friedman, Legal Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L REV. 92, 131-33
(1974).
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involuntary euthanasia is the consequence of the first step down
the slippery slope of voluntary euthanasia.
However, in this context, even the slippery slope argument is
too simple. The first step proposed by the mercy-killers simply
does not exist as a significant factor.87 As discussed previously,
the patient who is capable of making a voluntary choice does not,
by definition, qualify for the narrowly drawn and carefully applied
mercy-killing proposal. Although Professor Kamisar argues that
the slide down the slope begins when the first step toward euthanasia is taken, his real point is, or ought to be, that the first step
does not exist; in reality the first step is a jump into a chasm. Voluntary euthanasia is simply a "bait and switch" sales device. If
mercy-killing is to be accepted for what it is, its proponents should
candidly advocate involuntary euthanasia from the beginning. 88
As pointed out earlier, the various arguments against mercykilling are interrelated. Facing involuntary euthansia squarely, it
must be admited that mercy-killing is essentially the business of
making quality of life decisions, and that the patient will not be
making those decisions. Those making the decisions will be subject to serious conflicts of interest in the decisionmaking process.
The question then becomes whose pain and suffering (and financial burden) will be the motivating factor in the euthanasia
decision.
I.

The Danger of Abuse

In considering the wisdom of acquiring a new power over individuals' lives, the value of the use of such a power must be contrasted with the dangers of its abuse. The dangers involved take
two principal forms. First, there is a danger of subtle societal pressure for increased mercy-killings through the creation of expectations.89 Second, there is a danger of overt governmental abuse.
The obvious example of this second danger dates back a mere
forty years to the experience of World War II, when euthanasia in
Germany was originally available for only the priviledged few, but
87. See infra notes 105-7 and accompanying text.
88. Kamisar most clearly presents this danger
In 1950, Lord Chomley once again called the voluntary euthanasia
bill to the attention of the House of Lords. He was most articulate, if
not too discreet. . . "Another objection is that the Bill does not go
far enough, because it applies only to adults and does not apply to
children who come into the world deaf, dumb and crippled, and who
have a much better case than those for whom the Bill provides. That
may be so, but we must go step by step."
Kamisar, supra note 3, at 1016.
89. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
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gradually became the tool for extermination of the Jews.9 0 Society
recoils with incredulity at the thought of such abuses today-that
isn't going to happen here. It is difficult, indeed, to believe that
such a terror could be repeated. It is more comfortable, and indeed
probably more plausible, to smirk at such concerns and go about
daily routines in comfort and security-as did the military officers
stationed in Pearl Harbor on the sunny morning of December 7,
1941.
The preceeding analogy is obviously melodramatic. There is no
substantial proof that such serious and horrifying abuses will be
repeated. But to adequately assess the negative value of possible
governmental abuses, the very small probability of reoccurrence
must be multiplied by the enormity of the dangers involved. A
very small chance of an utterly unacceptable danger cannot be dismissed simply because of low probability. 91
J. Negative Impact on Research
The horror of cancer has brought about a monumental, national
effort to search for cures and treatments. The tragedy of young
children's bodies deteriorating from muscular dystrophy has produced the "telethon," in which entertainers, politicians, members
of the clergy, and persons from all walks of life are united in the
fight against a common enemy--disease. That which is horrible society fights with vehemence. However, in mercy-killing, society
has found a way to ease its suffering as well as an opiate for its
conscience. Mercy-killing isn't horrible. While mercy-killing is a
drastic event from the perspective of the terminally ill patient, it is
only temporarily drastic for those who go on living. And the physician, whose self-image of godliness is shaken by his frustrating inability to save the terminally ill patient, would see his frustrations
terminated with the patient's life.
90. Id. (emphasis added, footnote omitted) (quoting 169 H.L. DEB. 551, 559
(1950)). A translation of a secret order signed by Hitler, dated September 1,
1939, introduced during the Nuremberg Trials, stated:
Reichsleiter Bouhler and Dr. Brandt, M.D. are charged with the
resporisibility of enlarging the authority of certain physicians ... in
such a manner that persons who, according to human judgment, are
incurable can, upon a more careful diagnosis of their condition of
sickness, be accorded a mercy death.

2

TRIALs OF WAR CRiMiNALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILrARY TRIBUNALS

UNDER CONTROL CoUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 196 (1950). This order signaled the

beginning of the extermination of the Jews. See A. MITSCHERUiCH & F.
IELKE, DOCTORS OF INFAMY 92 (1949); Kamisar, supra note 3, at 1034-35.

91. There are, of course, some who believe the chance is more substantial than
portrayed here. At the time of this writing, our society is experiencing a significant turn toward conservatism and militarism, less than thirty years after
its painful experience with McCarthyism.
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It is obviously difficult to predict whether the acceptance of
mercy-killing will, in fact, take away the stinging stimulus that now
cries out for medical research. While this situation is unprecedented in modern medical history, the suffering brought by war
may be analogous. World War I brought the desperate attempt to
form the League of Nations. World War II gave birth to the United
Nations. But a short period of peace, at least on an international
scale, resulted in the complete deterioration of the promised enforcement structure of world peace. 92 The American agony of the
93
drawn out Vietnam War produced less than a decade of pacifism.
Because American society does not mobilize in the absence of
drastic pressure, the ultimate irony of the acceptance of mercykilling would be the increased need for mercy-killing due to its effect of inhibiting the drive to find cures and treatments for the terminally ill patient.9 4
92. The United Nations Charter provides:
All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the
maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make
available to the Security Council, units on call and in accordance
with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance,
and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose
of maintaining international peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 43, para. 1. The Charter further provides:
In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military
measures, members shall hold immediately available national air
force contingents for combined international enforcement action.
The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents ... shall
be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement
or agreements referred to in Article 43 ....
Id. art. 45. However, no such "agreements" were ever reached, and the dream
of world government by United Nations forces soon vanished. Today's
United Nations peace-keeping forces (which are generally a token force
designed to enforce a truce between two fighting factions) are formed on a
voluntary basis, and do not reflect the enforcement power of the Security
Council. Rather, the peace-keeping forces are formed after ad-hoc action
taken by the General Assembly, which may only "discuss," "consider," and
"make recommendations." See id. art. 10 & 11.
93. At the time of this writing, the United States had just invaded Grenada, had
troops in Lebanon, and disarmament talks with the Soviet Union had broken
off because of the introduction of new nuclear missiles in Europe.
94. The inability of the proponents of mercy-killing to think in terms of a dynamic technology is not surprising. Lawyers, judges, and legal scholars often
seem to make proposals and law on the implicit assumption that the technological world will remain static. A classic example of this phenomenon is
found in the development of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard for determining what activity constitutes a "search" within the meaning
of the fourth amendment. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). At
what point in time, if any, are those "expectations" frozen? If we assume
they are frozen into the expectations one would have had in 1791 (a logical
time to choose), then the only intrusion one might expect would be a nearby
listener. The Katz opinion seems to assume that the reasonableness of a per-
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K. Discriminatory Mercy-Killing

Physicians, who of necessity would be the group most involved
in mercy-killing decisions, are predominantly white, upper-middle
class, and, although there is no statistically sound basis for making
such a projection, experience suggests, politically conservative.
When making the important, and yet subjective, decisions to terminate life, physicians' prejudices and biases must be taken into
account.
The American system of health care can currently be criticized
by the assertion that the system favors the wealthy and the socially enfranchised. The danger that the power of mercy-killing
will be either consciously or, more importantly, subconsciously
employed to terminate socially or racially disenfranchised patients
cannot be overlooked. It is difficult to believe that public hospitals
can be expected to entirely ignore the temptation to terminate a
public assistance patient when the alternative is a lengthy and expensive terminal hospital stay for which he cannot pay.
A similar type of discrimination that is extremely prevalent in
the context of the terminally ill patient is ageism. In recent years,
groups calling themselves the "Grey Panthers" have come forward
to demonstrate to a society obsessed with youth that older persons
simply cannot be discarded. Yet, it is clear that physicians downgrade the value of saving older patients, and more readily declare
them to be "terminal." Unfortunately, physicians often tend to
lose track of broader social values as they bury themselves in scientific objectivity. 95 To physicians, an older patient is simply a
person with fewer remaining healthy years to live. 96 However, all
son's expectation of privacy will be determined by 1967 standards. However,
one could easily read Katz as leaving "reasonable expecations of privacy"
open to future technological change. Given future abilities to monitor distant
conversations, one's reasonable expectation of privacy in the year 2050 may
be no privacy at all.
95. See, e.g., Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause: Medico-Legal Conflicts in
the Concept of Causation, 31 TEx. L. REV. 631 (1953). Consider Miami Coal
Co. v. Luce, 76 Ind. App. 245, 131 N.E. 824 (1921), in which a man was injured
in a mine explosion. After fifteen days of misery due to extensive internal
injuries, he died. In the widow's suit for compensation, the doctors testified
that the "cause" of death was not the explosion, but obstructed bowels. Id. at
249, 131 N.E. at 825. Fortunately, the court intervened and interposed a "common sense" version of causation.
96. An analogy may be drawn to the medical school practice of denying older
students admission on the theory that they would have less time to serve the
community after graduation. While there is a simplistic logic in this approach, it overlooks broader social values, which have since been embodied
in the Federal Age Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (1975). See 45 C.F.R.
§ 90 (1983) (Health and Human Services Regulations expressly interpreting
the Act to prohibit such "longevity" of service discrimination). See also
Schuck, The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age DiscriminationAct of
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members of society have an expectation of becoming "senior citizens," 97 and have a vested interest in dedicated health care for
older patients.
L.

Impact on Patient Recovery Rates

Physicians universally agree that a patient's mental outlook significantly affects his chances for recovery. 98 The brain can subtly,
but significantly, influence the body chemistry of recovery. Put in
its simplest terms, a patient who is trying to recover has the greatest chance for success. Conversely, and more importantly for the
purposes of this discussion, a patient who has abandoned the effort
to recover may, in so doing, sign his own death warrant. In a society that rejects mercy-killing, a patient, although labeled terminally ill, has no alternative but to strive for recovery. As mercykilling is condoned and accepted, patients are encouraged to give
up hope and thereby significantly decrease their chances for recovery. The patient and his physician must fight together to combat
his disease. 99
V. A CRITICAL EVALUATION
The arguments against mercy-killing must be examined against
society's recent experiences with euthanasia. Persuasive legal arguments that are not accepted by society are a Pyrrhic victory.
Most of the arguments against mercy-killing either cannot be, or
have not to date been, definitively proven or disproven and therefore must be accepted or rejected on their persuasive value alone.
For example, the validity of the argument that a person's life might
be terminated and then a cure found for his disease (the "sails of
rescue" argument) has not yet been proven. Yet the degree of progress in the treatment of cancer through, for example, chemother1975, 89 YALE L.J. 27, 71-72 (1979). Schuck notes that "such logic would well
be extended to exclude the elderly from almost all general social programs on
the theory that the benefits they derive will be ephemeral relative to younger
persons." Id. at 72.
97. This is regarded as being true, at least in the absence of more direct contact
with mercy-killing.
98. See, e.g., Booth, A Spontaneous Recovery from Cancer, 5 J. AM. AcAD. PsYCHOANALYSIs 207, 207-14 (1977) "[M] any cancer patients deteriorate rapidly
after they have been told they have cancer because they are affected by the
pessimistic attitude of the medical profession as far as the prognosis is concerned." Id. at 208. See also Glasser, Rosenberg & Gaito, Wide spreadAdenocarcinomaof the Colon with Survival of 28 Years, 241 J. A.M.A. 2542, 2542-43

(1979).
99. The United States learned the dangers of a half-hearted war effort in Viet
Nam. Those who do not learn from the mistakes of history are bound to repeat them.
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apy, has certainly been substantial. Thus, the validity of the "sails
of rescue" argument has increased.
It is also too soon to document any noticeable effect of the availability of mercy-killing on the self-healing powers of patients. As
rates of cure increase through medical progress, losses due to the
decrease in desire to fight for survival may be obscurred, and may
never be demonstrable. Competent medical researchers should be
encouraged to investigate this factor in the next decade to determine the significance of the argument. Similarly, the extreme dangers of governmental abuse of mercy-killing, for example, in
eugenics-oriented programs, have not yet been demonstrated. On
the other hand, even critics of the governmental abuse argument
will admit that there has hardly been sufficient experience with
mercy-killing to justify confidence, on an empirical basis, that the
argument is unwarranted.
Significant statistical research over the next decade may prove
that the argument regarding the racially and socially discriminatory mercy-killing propensities of physicians is true. Finally, although no apparent change has been observed in the dedication to
research the effects of increased mercy-killing, these issues will
have to remain unanswered until there is sufficient time for trends
to appear. Further, on the federal level, increased military spending at the expense of domestic spending will, in the near future,
tend to obscure the significance of much of the available data on
these issues. 100
The foregoing discussion is obviously not intended to concede
the failure of these arguments. Rather, the acknowledgment must
be made that none of these arguments have yet come to the forefront of the euthanasia debate through dramatic or significant
demonstration. On the other hand, it should be noted that none of
the arguments have been disproven by our basic experience.
Kamisar's theory that the law in 1958 was operating ideally by
restricting euthanasia through fear, yet not punishing mercy-killers in extremely drastic situations, has not been proven untrue,
but it has more or less been rendered moot. Even in those jurisdictions in which the state courts have not yet rendered Quinlan or
Saikewicz type decisions, the impact of the current trend toward
the freedom to terminate one's life is clear. It is difficult to believe
that statutes that formally declare mercy-killing to be murder have
any significant deterrent value. The lack of deterrence is related to
its placebo-like nature. The deterrent value only works if the lack
of punishment is not acknowledged. Thus, a choice between deter100. Private efforts, however, can be monitored. However, a significant period of
time will be necessary before any clear trends will appear.
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rence and non-punishment will eventually have to be made, and at
least some punishment implemented, in order to reinstate the deterrent value if the statute is to resume operation as a highly selective screening device.
On the other hand, society's limited experience with mercy-killing has to a shocking degree validated several of the anti-euthanasia arguments. Extrapolating from such a limited sample, the
potential is nothing short of horrifying. For example, as previously
noted, there are inherent difficulties in a system that attempts to
incorporate adequate safeguards to ensure a degree of reliability
commensurate with the drastic nature of the actions involved, and
at the same time operate with sufficient speed and ease to allow a
painless and dignified death. Both the Quinlan and Saikewicz decisions have been plagued with these difficulties, and considerable
debate has been generated in the medico-legal literature and the
cases that have followed. 101
In Quinlan, the court created a privacy right and then distributed it to a vast number of persons. Indeed, about the only person
who did not have a say in the decisionmaking was Karen herself.
However, the problem with Quinlan was that one of the safeguards worked-the ethics committee rejected mercy-killing. The
Quinlans then circumvented the safeguard, thereby demonstrating
the danger of abuse. The real danger may be that these decisions
involve concrete answers to unanswerable questions. Therefore,
because the various steps in any reasonable system of safeguards
are necessarily contradictory, the process of euthanasia is paralyzed, producing neither a clear decision in favor of mercy-killing
nor a clear decision against it. Any possible action toward mercykilling or any inaction to prolong the procedure would be, in effect,
abuse, at least from some perspective.
The Saikewicz approach was severely criticized by the omniscient physicians; after all, God does not hold hearings before he
101. See, e.g., Baron, Assuring "DetatchedBut PassionateInvestigationand Decision'". The Role of GuardiansAd Litem in Saikewicz-Type Cases, 4 AM. J.L. &
MED. 111 (1978)
(agrees with the judicial dominance envisioned by
Saikewicz, but prefers a more adversarial process); Buchanan, Medical Paternalism or Legal Imperialism: Not the Only Alternativesfor Handling
Saikewicz-Type Cases, 5 AM. J.L & MED. 97 (1979) (poses an "alternative"
view that the decision will usually be made by the family and physician, subject to some sort of ethics committee unless a Living Will has made it for the
patient); Norris, Foreward, 5 Am. J.L & MED. at i (1979); Relman, The
Saikewicz Decision: A Medical Viewpoint, 4 Are. J.L & MED. 233 (1978) (believes physicians and family should make the entire "medical" decision). Assuming such decisions will have to be made, clearly the only plausible
argument is that presented by Baron, who points to insufficient judicial scrutiny in Saikewicz. But see In re Dinnerstien, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d
134 (1980).
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giveth or taketh away. 10 2 In response to the Quinlan/Saikewicz
controversy about euthanasia procedures, and the uproar against
these procedures in the medical community, most courts have all
03
but abandoned any attempt to establish meaningful safeguards.1
Even the Massachusetts court limited the Saikewicz approach to
the very unusual circumstances of that case, and virtually aban04
Thus, in the frightdoned that judicial model in In re Dinerstein.1
eningly short period of time since the beginning of formally
sanctioned mercy-killing, nearly all pretense of safeguards has
been abandoned or circumvented.
Such an approach, however, is not to be entirely criticized, at
least from one theoretical point of view. An "anti-safeguards" approach simply reflects a great deal of confidence in the medical
profession. This approach attempts to whole-heartedly accomplish the goals of mercy-killing (a swift, painless process) at the
expense of some danger of medical error, perceived by the mercykilling proponents to be, more or less, a minor problem. Unfortunately, if any anti-euthanasia argument has been verified by current experience, it is the argument that medical error is a serious
problem. Of course, the discovery of incidents of medical error will
be, inherently, unusual events in the mercy-killing context. Once a
102. See, e.g., Dunn, Who "Pulls the Plug'" The PracticalEffect of the Saikewicz
Decision, MEDICOLEGAL NEws (Winter Edition 1978); Relhman, supra note
101; Rehlman, The Saikewicz Decision. Judges as Physicians, 298 N.E. J. MED.
508 (1978).
The most serious problem in a Saikewicz-type hearing is the lack of any
institutionalized adversary to test the pro-termination conclusion being
presented to the court. In most of the early cases, the prosecutor was a
named party because of the desire for declaratory relief. The prosecutor's
office, although ill-equipped and unmotivated to do so, has generally represented the state's interest in life. Once the declaratory relief is received in
the first case in a given jurisdiction, the prosecutor becomes unnecessary. In
subsequent cases the only possible party for such a role is the guardian ad
litem, who is usually an attorney with political connections to the court and
little desire to "make waves."
103. See In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 420 N.E.2d 64, cert. denied, 454
U.S. 858 (1981). The more thoughtful, reflective opinion of the Appellate Division was In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980), which had
adopted the judicial model. However, Eichnerwas reversed in Storar, leaving
New York with even more limited safeguards than Quinlan provided in New
Jersey.
See also John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611
(Fla. App. 1983); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. App. 1978), affd, 379
So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
See, e.g.,In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1980). Dinnerstein, a Court of Appeals decision, was subsequently endorsed in In re
Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 635, 405 N.E.2d 115, 119-20 (1980), by the same court that
wrote Saikewicz.
104. In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1980).
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patient's life has been terminated, it will be difficult if not impossible to prove that he would have lived. Ironically, however, in the
very first case of judicially sanctioned mercy-killing Karen Quinlan
did not die as predicted. Obviously, the Quinlan case alone cannot
be seen as a statistically significant sample, but it is difficult to believe that in the veryfirst case, the physicians' predictions could be
so seriously wrong. 0 5
The conflicts of interest argument-that factors other than the
suffering of the patient will be considered in reaching a mercy-killing decision-has also been proven true. Who was suffering in the
Quinlan case? Certainly not Karen in her comatose state. The socalled mercy-killing decision in that case was certainly not intended to end Karen's suffering. The decision ended her family's
suffering. To put it bluntly, Quinlan simply was not a mercy-killing. In the harsh light of reality, the decision to terminate Karen's
life was made to ease someone else's pain-hardly the charitable
decision the New Jersey Supreme Court painted.106
It should be noted that the Saikewicz decision is not marred by
this flaw.107 Given Saikewicz's retarded condition, he certainly
would have suffered significantly had he undergone painful chemotherapy without any understanding of the consequences. It is
also to be conceded that Saikewicz died as his physicians predicted. The contrast between Quinlan and Saikewicz clearly
presents the troubling questions of mercy-killing. However, assuming, as no statistician would, that these two cases are typical,
and knowing that serious medical errors and conflicts of interest
105. A wrongfully terminated patient will, of course, be buried. The prediction
that death will occur is the only assertion whose accuracy will be effectively
tested, and even then, only where passive euthanasia is employed based
upon that prediction.
Legal scholars as human beings have their own prejudices. A similar example of a significant medical error in recommending the termination of a
patient's life, who was found not to be terminally ill, occurred recently in the
author's family. It can only be presumed that medical error is an extremely
pervasive problem, since the vast majority of such errors go undetected.
106. The New Jersey Supreme Court in Quinlan wrote:
Here a loving parent, qua parent and raising the rights of his incompetent and profoundly damaged daughter, probably irreversibly
doomed to no more than a biologically vegetative remnant of life, is
before the court. He seeks authorization to abandon specialized
technological procedures which can only maintain for a time a body
having no potential for resumption or continuance of other than a
"vegetative" existence.
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 38, 355 A.2d 647, 662-63 (1976).
For the contrary view of those who believe in cryonic suspension in the
hope of a future life when a subsequent cure is found, see IL NELSON, WE
FROZE THE FIRST MAN (1968); Henderson & Ettinger, Cryonic Suspension and
the Law, 15 UCLA L REv. 414 (1968).
107. Problems suggested by the Article will not occur in every mercy-killng case.
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will result in one out of two cases, would mercy-killing be the favored result?
The argument that voluntary euthanasia will be used as "bait
and switch" fraud to sell involuntary euthanasia has been demonstrated. Neither Karen Quinlan nor Joseph Saikewicz asked to be
euthanatized. In fact only a tiny minority of the cases decided
have dealt with so-called voluntary mercy-killing. 0 8 More important is the fact that involuntary euthanasia is being deceitfully portrayed. The Quinlan court, as noted previously, focused first on a
privacy right that belongs to Karen Quinlan. Then, in a questionable shift, the court arranged for a "substituted decision." Such
substituted decisions are questionable because they attempt to
misrepresent the nature of euthanasia. Consider the following inane argument by the Quinlan court:
We have no doubt, in these unhappy circumstances, that if Karen were
herself miraculously lucid for an interval (not altering the existing prognosis of the condition to which she would soon return) and perceptive of
her irreversible condition, she could effectively decide upon discontinuance of the life-support apparatus, even if it meant the prospect of natural
death.... We perceive no thread of logic distinguishing between such a
choice which under the evidence of this case, could be made by a competent patient. 109

Such reasoning is analogous to designing automobile headlights
that work only in the daytime.
The whole point is that if Karen were lucid, her prognosis
would be altered, and she would not be eligible for mercy-killing.
If the discussion of voluntary mercy-killing is not deceitful persua108. See Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1239 (1978); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. App. 1978), affid, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980). But cf.
Severns v. Wilmington Med. Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); John F.
Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. App. 1983); In re
Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 729, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1980); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J.10, 355 A.2d
647 (1976); In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303 (1983); In re Storar,
52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981); In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d
431,426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980); Leach v. Akron Gen. Med. Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1,
426 N.E.2d 809 (1980); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
A particularly odd, supposedly voluntary, euthanasia case is In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978). Although in Quackenbush
the court found the patient to be capable of a voluntary decision, the patient
was clearly insane. The opinion reeks of ageism. The patient's condition was
clearly not terminal; he could have lived a healthy life if the court had not felt
bound to follow Quinlan. A fair reading of Quackenbush is that any lunatic
may choose to decline invasive medical treatment at will, even if it means
committing suicide, as long as he does not do so for religious reasons. But see
Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1982) (stating the
right to privacy does not include the right to commit suicide).
109. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 39, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976).
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sion in favor of involuntary mercy-killing, then what is its relevance in the Quinlan opinion? Every opinion following Quinlan
bases its analysis on the Quinlan privacy notion.l" 0 Therefore, the
assumption must be made that the true nature of involuntary
mercy-killing cannot be legally justified.
Finally, the argument that mercy-killing, even in originally
carefully limited circumstances, will damage the moral fabric of
our society, has been verfied by present experiences with euthanasia. Note how even the Saikewicz court, while adamantly denying
that it considered the quality of life issue,11 1 of necessity decided
the case on that basis. Obviously this unacceptable line drawing
cannot be avoided and the quality of life issue will inevitably continue to arise in mercy-killing decisions.
Perhaps the best example of the subtle acceptance of mercykilling is demonstrated by the previous discussion of Living Wills.
Recall that one commentator argued that the mere failure to execute a Living Will should not be considered a demonstration of the
absence of such intent, but rather the possibility should be considered that the now terminally ill patient did not plan for his unfortunate demise. While this argument is quite logical, especially in
view of practical experience, a degree of acceptance of the routine
nature of mercy-killing is inherent in its statement.
Living Will statutes were previously favored because of the assumption that mercy-killing was the unusual and extreme course
of action; at least such an extreme course of action should be available to those willing to take the well safeguarded,112 affirmative
steps necessary to effectuate mercy-killing. In less than two years,
perceptions have already shifted to such a degree that affirmative
action is now almost required in order for a person to ensure that
heroic measures are taken to preserve his life in the event of incapacity. This is because there is no alternative "living non-will" provided for in the statutory scheme to ensure that extraordinary
measures will be taken in the event of incapacitation.
This situation leads to an even greater degree of subtle social
acceptance.113 Thus, in an incredibly short time, society's position
on the preservation of life has changed from an absolute right to an
110.
111.
112.
113.

For cases relying on the Quinlan reasoning, see supra note 108.
See supra note 38.
See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
The author has been teaching seminars touching upon the present topic for
five years. When the position advocated in the text, and the author's desire to
have "heroic measures" was raised in the first year's class (1978), it met with
no objection from the students. The tone of the class has gradually shifted.
In more recent years, a number of students have argued that one had no right
to burden society by requesting heroic measures. Although this is certainly
not a statistically sound sampling technique, it is indicative of a trend.
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exception in unusual circumstances, to a well-accepted process of
mercy-killing, and finally to a situation where terminating life is
almost an obligation expected of our society in order to conserve
resources. It is doubtful that Professor Kamisar, writing in 1958,
ever dreamed such a result would occur so swiftly. Even the skeptics of the "slippery slope" argument must admit that some impressive movement has taken place.
The effort of this Article has been to apply extraordinary measures in a desperate attempt to resuscitate the value of the preservation of life. However, note must be taken of significant
technological trends that have undercut many of the original arguments, and sociological trends that have added to that effect. Since
1958, the number of Americans being treated in what might be described as terminal care have increased. Indeed, as one author has
described, there is now "in every hospital in the country a shadowy community"" 4 of Americans in limbo between life and death.
Developments in medical technology, which were not widely
available when Kamisar wrote in 1958, have drastically increased
the number of persons in such terminal care situations. In other
words, Kamisar's "greatest good for the greatest number" arguments have sustained a substantial shift in the numbers. With or
without assistance from Quinlan or Saikewicz, a fairly well-known
and substantial trend of unsanctioned mercy-killing has developed
in terminal care-oriented medical circles.115
However, a great deal of this extra-legal trend among terminalcare physicians is attributable to expectations of where the legal
system was headed. There is still, however, the possibility that a
strong legal response in future Quinlan- or Saikewicz-type cases
in other jurisdictions could serve to reverse the trend. If these opinons are bolstered by sound policy-based analysis, rather than by
formalistic reference to previously non-existent privacy rights,
such opinions might gain sufficient moral force and legitimacy to
compel substantial compliance. It is the role of lawyers and judges
not only to argue the law in the traditional forums, but to mobilize
the necessary constituencies to support their positions.
Coinciding with the technological developments of the 1960's
and 1970's was a significant move in legal circles toward the furtherance of patient autonomy. This movement grew primarily
from the area of informed consent or technical battery malpractice
litigation.116 While this trend is not directly related to mercy-killing, and is entirely unrelated to involuntary euthanasia, it is diffi114. Hyland & Baime, supra note 27, at 107.
115. See supra note 11.
116. See, e.g., Cantenbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Contra Hirsch,
Informed Consent - Fact or Fiction?, J. LEG. MED., Jan. 1977, at 25-27 (sug-
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cult to conceive of the patient's right to informed consent and
decisionmaking without the corresponding right to decline treatment. In some cases, the right to decline treatment would necessarily produce passive, voluntary euthanasia.
This right should not be confused with the privacy right referred to in Quinlan and its progeny. Informed patient decisionmaking is common law doctrine, a product of the "consent"
element of a battery action against a physician."17 However, such a
right to decline treatment should extend up to, but not include, the
right to commit suicide."18 Thus, where a clearly successful treatment is available, and death would be the probable result of declining the treatment, a patient's common law autonomy should end,
and society's interest in the preservation of life should take over.
The alternative of allowing patients the right to decline treatment, at least if they can voluntarily do so, is, again, superficially
attractive. But the argument results in the same problems dealt
with earlier. The right to terminate treatment would soon be extended to others to be exercised for the incompetent patient, as in
Quinlan; and the temptation to subtly convert passive euthanasia
into active euthanasia, where some affirmative act by the physician
would achieve a significantly more effective and painless result,
would once again arise.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is hoped that this Article will play a part in counteracting the
"advertising campaign" approach being used to legitimize mercykilling through such catchy slogans as "death with dignity." The
prospect of mercy-killing is certainly, at best, a mixed blessing for
the terminally ill patient. The enormous probability of medical error, the significant value of holding on to and preserving life in the
hopes of finding a cure, and the danger that future mercy-killing
proceedings will become routine, sloppy, and discriminatory warrant outright rejection of any such practice. Even the skeptics,
gesting that patients neither want, understand, nor remember the informed
consent material conveyed by physicians).
117. It is amusing to note that lawyers do not apply the same standard to their
own practice. See Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed
Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979). The strict
"battery" analysis, of course, is not literally applicable, as there is no "touching" involved in the practice of law.
118. While many readers may not agree, this view is the author's position. For
decisions supporting this position, see supra notes 18-21 and accompanying
text. Cf. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129,
137, 529 P.2d 553, 561 (1974) ('The protective privilege ends were the public
peril begins."), reh'g granted, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334
(1976).
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however, will hopefully be convinced that the question is not as
clear cut as the superficial opinions to date have made it appear.
The fears that were first voiced by Professor Kamisar in 1958,
and modified or embellished here by the added objections discussed in this Article, have been, for the most part, proven true by
society's very brief experieces with euthanasia. It is highly probable that mercy-killing is or will, in the near future, be used on
cases that certainly had not been considered the most extreme and
demanding cases a decade ago. Voluntary mercy-killing is certainly not being practiced and, indeed, experience suggests the
constant references to voluntary mercy-killing are simply an attempt to divert consideration away from the real issue. The godlike physicians do make mistakes, and made a serious mistake in
the first case to receive national attention. Those who look beyond
the detailed and sympathetic concern afforded the initial "headline" cases can see a routine of sloppy and discriminatory decisionmaking, and must fear for the poor and disenfranchised patients in
public hospitals. Acceptance of euthanasia for the terminally ill is
even spawning acceptance of a parallel mercy-killing of the deformed newborn,119 and well publicized attempts to commit suicide.120 As today's deformed and unfit are "euthanatized," the
marginally fit will become tomorrow's "unfit," and so on. When the
preservation of life is abandoned, society will be drawn inexorably
into dangerous questions of eugenics and the quality of life.
The problem confronted by this Article is that the first stepvoluntary, passive euthanasia for the terminally ill patient-is obviously extremely attractive and, on the surface, fundamentally
reasonable. As the first step is taken, however, the results of that
first step must be considered. Each individual must subjectively
balance the competing values involved in deciding whether the
first step is worthwhile in view of its consequences. Slogans, rhetoric, and unrealistic, but well-chosen hypotheticals cannot be the
core of this analysis.
119. See, e.g., The Case of Baby JaneDoe, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 28, 1983, at 45-46. The
article also discussed the related case of a twelve-year-old cancer victim. Id.
at 45. In response to this problem, the Department of Health and Human
Services has established a toll-free, neonatal hot line and, as of November,
1983, had received 1,633 calls regarding such incidents. Id. at 46.
120. One such attempt was that of Elizabeth Bouvia, a quadriplegic cerebral palsy
victim, who sought to prevent her hospital from force-feeding her. The court
wisely refused to grant her the restraining order. Death, 70 A.B.A. J., Feb.
1984, at 29. "Reaching an opposite conclusion, a Syracuse, New York judge
ruled on February 2, 1984, that an 85-year-old man depressed about his poor
health has the right to refuse food and should not be force-fed by nursinghome attendants." When Lauyers Second-Guess Doctors, 96 U.S. NEWS &
WoRLD REP., Feb. 13, 1984, at 45.

